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Abstract
This paper develops concordance indices for studying the simultaneous occurrence
of financial crises. The indices are designed to cope with these typically low inci-
dence events. This leads us to confine attention to non-tranquil periods to develop
a bivariate index and its multivariate analog for potentially serially correlated cat-
egorical data. An application to the Bordo et al. (2001) data set reveals the
extent of concordance in banking and currency crises across countries. The inter-
nationalisation of financial crises in the 20th century is shown to have increased
for currency crises and decreased for banking crises.
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1 Introduction
Financial crises can have a huge impact on economies, but fortunately do
not occur very often. The probability of a country experiencing a financial
crisis—currency, banking or twin—is by most calculations very low; for ex-
ample Eichengreen and Bordo (2003) produce a figure of 12 percent for 56
countries over the sample 1973–1997.
Nevertheless there is substantial policy and academic interest in whether
crises do occur together, particularly across international borders, and indeed
as to whether there are differences between financial crises at the beginning
and end of the 20th century; see Eichengreen and Bordo (2003) and Bordo
et al (2001). The concern with the transmission of crises between countries
and markets is such that we find it worth considering appropriate measure-
ment of the true extent of the relationships between the observed crisis data.
To do this we develop both a bivariate and multivariate concordance index
which provides information on the extent of international interdependence in
financial crises based on the probability of observing independent crises. This
index can be applied at a point in time, but also produces a time series with
which to assess changes in the internationalisation of financial crises. The
approach formalises the counting of co-occurrences of financial crises across
borders; see Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). Our adaptations consist of ac-
counting for the low incidence of crisis events in categorical data, giving a
turbulent period concordance index which ranges between zero, when there
are no occurrences of simultaneous crises, and one, where all crisis occur
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in synchronisation with other crises.1 The great advantage of concordance
indices compared to correlation coefficients is the possibility of addressing
synchronisation among more than two crises.
We also show how to conduct tests with the index to determine whether
observed contemporaneous financial crises are statistically independent, and
account for potential serial correlation in the series. The tests can be used
to calculate critical values of bivariate concordance indices (and correlaton
coefficients) and multivariate concordance indices. The turmoil periods con-
cordance index is applied to the data set of Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel
and Martinez-Peria (2001) covering banking and currency crises from 1883
to 1998 for 21 countries. The results show that any observation of 5 (4)
contemporaneous currency (banking) crises rejects the null of independence
in the occurrence of these events.
A significant advantage of our turbulent period concordance index is in
analysing the characteristics of global financial turmoil. The proposed con-
cordance index is ordinal, with the properties that it retains a constant value
in periods of tranquility, declines when independent, country specific financial
crises occur and increases during periods of internationally linked financial
turmoil. This helps to distinguish whether a particular crisis period is likely
to be associated with country-specific factors (christened here independent fi-
nancial turmoil) or with international turmoil. Using the data set of Bordo et
al. (2001), Eichengreen and Bordo (2003) and Bordo et al (2001) previously
concluded that financial crises have not evidently grown more severe over the
20th century but are more prevalent. Our analysis augments this outcome
1The extension to relationships between non-contemporaneous crises is straightforward.
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by showing that while both currency and banking crises have become more
prevalent, currency crises are more likely to be associated with international
turmoil at the end of the 20th century than the beginning, while banking
crises are more likely to be independently occurring at the end of the 20th
century compared with international banking crises at the beginning of the
century. The degree to which financial crises are international has changed
over the 20th century, and differently for the two types of crisis considered.
The analysis also allows a number of augmentations of existing results of
Bordo et al (2001) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). First, the prevalence
of currency crises has increased regardless of whether countries are classified
as developing. Second, while looser capital controls may be associated with
more banking crises, these banking crises are also more likely to be associ-
ated with independent turmoil as opposed to international financial turmoil.
Third, the results support the assertion that banking crises may have led
currency crises in the 1970s, but without evidence as to whether they were
reinforcing in the opposite direction. Finally, we discuss how the concordance
indices may be used to make conditional statements on the international or
domestic nature of observed financial crises thus contributing to the discus-
sion on whether financial crises should be addressed with international or
domestic policy solutions, see for example Karolyi (2003).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 defines what is meant by con-
cordance indices of crises, and why this is a useful concept for examining
crisis synchronisation. The turbulent period concordance index appropriate
to the current situation of relatively rarely occurring events is developed.
A multivariate extension and its properties are outlined. The process for
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obtaining critical values of the concordance index is described in Section 3.
The concordance index and tests are then applied to the Bordo et al data
in Section 4, and its usefulness is further illustrated in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2 Synchronisation and Concordance Indices
Let a financial crisis be represented by the binary variable Sit, where i = nm,
which takes the value one if a crisis occurs in country n and market m in
period t and zero otherwise.2 When these two series are identical, that is Sxt
= Syt for all t, the series are perfectly synchronised.
When two series exhibit strong synchronisation, and we omit the uninter-
esting cases where the series are either continually in crisis, or continually not
(Sxt = 1 or Sxt = 0 for all t) two measures are of interest in describing how
synchronised the series are. These are the means of the two series, and the
correlation between them. In the case of perfect synchronisation µSx = µSy
and ρSxy = 1. The statistics µSx and ρSxy describe the synchronisation be-
tween the series, but it is perfectly possible to observe series Sxt, Syt and Szt
where µSx = µSy = µSz but ρSxy 6= ρSxz, that is the series have the same
means but different correlation coefficients, or that the correlation coefficients
are the same, but the means differ. In this case the synchronisation between
the series will differ.
2Note that we confine attention to categorical data on financial crises here. If the
underlying data generating process is known, one could apply for example copulas as done
by Rodriguez (2003).
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Concordance indices provide a means of incorporating information on
both the mean and correlation of the series in an ordinal (although not car-
dinal) manner. Such indices can also be simply extended to the multivariate
environment, an attractive feature for assessing crises across numerous coun-
tries and markets.
2.1 Bivariate concordance indices
Concordance indices can be simply constructed by ‘counting’ the number of
times the variables Sxt and Syt are in various combinations of states (with
analogs expressed in terms of means and correlation coefficients). In a bi-
variate setting the total observations in the sample (T ) consist of the number
of simultaneous crises periods (#(1, 1)), the number of periods with a single
crisis (#(1)) and the number of tranquil periods (#(0)), or
T ≡ #(1, 1) + #(1) + #(0).
Harding and Pagan (2005) advocate measuring the degree of synchronisation
in business cycles in terms of the fraction of time the cycles are in the same
phase. Their concordance index has the form
Iˆt =
#(1, 1) + #(0)
T
(
= 1− #(1)
T
)
. (1)
The relevance of the expression between brackets will become clear in our
discussion of multivariate synchronisation below. The index can also be
expressed in terms of the estimated means µˆSx , µˆSy and the estimated cor-
5
relation coefficient ρˆS between Sxt and Syt
Iˆ = 1 + 2ρˆS(µˆSx(1− µˆSx))1/2(µˆSy(1− µˆSy))1/2 + 2µˆSxµˆSy − µˆSx − µˆSx . (2)
High concordance can be achieved with |ρˆS| = 1, regardless of the mean value.
For our purposes a focus on perfect offsets, ρˆS = −1, is of less interest. That
is we are not particularly interested in the case where country A is always in
a crisis when country B is not, and vice versa.
A typical feature of financial crises is their low incidence, or a large num-
ber of tranquil periods in the sample. It seems natural then to confine at-
tention to the concordance of crises in turbulent periods and introduce the
turbulent-periods concordance index
Iˆ tp =
#(1, 1)
T −#(0)
(
= 1− #(1)
T −#(0)
)
, (3)
where we assume that there is at least one crisis in our sample, i.e., T −
#(0) 6= 0. Equation (3) gives the number of times in which the two markets
are both in crisis as a proportion of the number of times there are any crises
in the sample. Hence, the influence of the dominant non-crisis periods is
removed.3
3In an earlier version we also describe the crisis-only concordance index, which has the
same numerator as the turbulent-periods concordance index, but takes T as its denomi-
nator. This was found to be less useful as it did not necessarily produce high values of
the concordance index in the case of high correlation of the crisis indicators, due to the
prevalence of non-crisis observations.
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Figure 1: Turbulent Periods Concordance Index
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Rewriting gives a slightly more complicated expression
Iˆ tp =
ρˆs(µˆSx(1− µˆSx))1/2(µˆSy(1− µˆSy))1/2 + µˆSxµˆSy
− (ρˆs(µˆSx(1− µˆSx))1/2(µˆSy(1− µˆSy))1/2 + µˆSxµˆSy)+ µˆSx + µˆSx , (4)
which is plotted in Figure 1.
Figure 1 shows that high concordance is achieved when correlation is
high, ρˆs = 1, or means are high µˆSx = µˆSy = µˆS = 1, or a combination
of these two characteristics. As either of ρˆs or µˆS approach one, the value
of the concordance index increases. This makes intuitive sense because as
the number of crisis observations in the sample increases the possibility of
overlap also increases, even in the extreme case of independence of crises (a
topic to which we return below). The turbulent-periods concordance index
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is the focus of the remainder of the paper, and as such is simply referred to
as the concordance index.
2.2 Multivariate concordance indices
Consider the case of concordance in the context of multiple financial crises
across m financial markets and n countries, giving a total of nm potential
crises indices. We may be interested in testing for concordance in a number of
ways here. It may be that we are interested in any instances of concordance
across the indices, so that we are interested in the joint occurrence of 2 or
more 1s in the index. Denote this as (#1 > 2). More generally we may be
interested in instances where Z or more indices have the value of 1. Denote
this as (#1 > Z). The number of times this may occur in any given nm
crises is given by nm multichoose Z, so in the case of nm = 6, Z = 3 gives
12 possible combinations.4
Then the multivariate forms of the turbulent periods concordance index
is given by:
Iˆ tp =
(#1 > Z)
T −#(0) = 1−
(#1 < Z)
T −#(0) , (5)
Figure 2 show the multivariate versions of the index for Z = 2. The
turbulent periods concordance index shows a trade-off in the value of the
index between the number of crises observed as a proportion of the number
of non-crisis periods. A simple interpretation is that this index will rise
whenever the number of simultaneous crises rises as a proportion of the total
4The formula for multichoose is nm multichoose Z = (nm+ Z)!/(n!m!).
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Figure 2: Multivariate Turbulent Periods Concordance Index
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number of periods in turmoil, and this may occur through either a rise in the
number of simultaneous crises without a change in the number of periods
of turmoil, or a fall in the number of periods of turmoil without a fall in
the number of simultaneous crises. This provides a convenient short hand
for comparing the coincidence of crises across different asset markets and
countries.
3 Critical Values for Concordance Indices
Concordance indices for various crisis series can be calculated as outlined
in the previous section. However, we are also interested as to whether an
observed concordance index exceeds a critical value indicating that the two
9
or multiple crises are no longer occurring coincidentally. This section outlines
how those critical values can be calculated.5
Tests of independence in a contingency table can be applied to obtain
critical values for concordance indices. For a introduction to testing indepen-
dence in two-way contingency tables see Agresti (2002, Chapter 3). Consider
the following contingency table
Table 1: Bivariate crises: contingency table
Crisis A No crisis A Row sums
Crisis B n11 = #(1, 1) n12 = #(1, 0) n1. = TµSB
No crisis B n21 = #(0, 1) n22 = #(0, 0) n2. = T (1− µSB)
Column sums n.1 = TµSA n.2 = T (1− µSA) T
Below we apply Fisher’s exact test in most cases, which proceeds as
follows. The probability of observing the outcomes in the table when all
marginal frequencies, i.e., column and row sums, are fixed is equal to
P1 = P{nij|n, n1., nn.1} = P{nij|n, n1.}
P{n.1|n}
=
n1.!n.1!n2.!n.2!
n!n11!n12!n21!n22!
. (6)
Since the row and column sums are fixed, only one of the nij may vary
independently. Without loss of generality, we take this to be n11. We can
use this expression to construct an exact test by calculating the probabilities
of any given configuration of frequencies and summing these over the tail
of the distribution of n11. Alternately the test can be used to calculate the
5In a companion paper we plan to address methodological issues more extensively.
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frequency of simultaneous crises observations required to obtain a rejection
of the null hypothesis of independence.
Corresponding critical values for the concordance indices and correlation
coefficients can be calculated directly from the critical value of the simulta-
neous crises n11, the incidences of the crises and the number of observations.
For the concordance indices this follows directly from Equations (1) and (3).
The critical value of the correlation coefficient of two binary crisis series can
be calculated by putting simultaneous 1s at the beginning of both series,
followed by the additional 1s for the first series and zeros for the other, and
the additional 1s for the second series and zeros for the first, completed by
zeros for the remainder of the observations.
The vital precondition for the application of the Fisher exact test is that
the individual crisis series, Sxt, are independent and identically distributed,
iid. In particular, we are concerned that they may exhibit serial correlation.
To establish whether the individual series exhibit first order serial correlation
we use the Fisher exact test for the null of independence against a first
order Markov chain by operating on the transition matrix of the series itself
(Anderson and Goodman, 1957). To make this clearer, consider a series Sxt,
which can take on state values 1 and 0 at time t. In its move to the next
period it can also take on either of these values, so that the transition matrix
between period t and period t+1 is represented by a two by two matrix with
elements (1, 1) , (1, 0), (0, 1), (0, 0) in the same form as the Fisher test shown
above. The null hypothesis of independence against a first order Markov
process can be tested by
H0 :
n11
n1.
=
n21
n2.
. (7)
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If the series for which a particular concordance index is calculated are
serially correlated we apply corrections to Pearson chi-squared statistics as
proposed by Tavare´ (1983) and Tavare´ and Altham (1983). The Pearson
X2 statistic for testing the null hypothesis of independence in an I × J
contingency table is defined
X2 =
∑
i
∑
j
(nij − µˆij)2
µˆij
,
where µˆij =
ni.n.j
n
. The Pearson X2 statistic is asymptotically chi-squared
with (I − 1)(J − 1) degrees of freedom, which is equal to one in 2 × 2 con-
tingency table. Let SA and SB be independent stationary two-state Markov
chains with transition matrices PSA , PSB and let λ and µ be the non-unit
eigenvalues of PSA and PSB . Then [(1− µλ)/(1 + µλ)]X2 is asymptotically
chi-squared with one degree of freedom. This result can be extended to test-
ing independence of the r-state process A and the c-state process B, provided
each of A and B is reversible, a condition which is met in our application.
The corresponding correction factor becomes
r−1∑
i=1
c−1∑
j=1
(
1− λiµj
1 + λiµj
)
,
where λi, µj are the non-unit eigenvalues of the transition matrices A and B,
respectively.
To find critical values for multivariate concordance indices we use simula-
tion techniques. In each replication we build a new matrix of observations on
crises dummies with the same properties as the originally observed data set.
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For iid series in the data set the crises means give the exact number of draws
from a uniform (0,1) distribution; these are converted into period numbers
for the 1s in the crisis dummies. In the case of serially correlated series, the
transition probabilities observed in the data are used to produce series with
the same serial correlation properties and the same number of crisis obser-
vations as the original data. The numbers in this matrix are summed: we
calculate the number of tranquil periods, single crisis periods, periods with
two or more simultaneous crises, three or more, etc. We use 10,000 replica-
tions to generate the critical values. Converting these critical values for the
totals into critical values for the multivariate concordance indices is again
straightforward from Equation (5).
4 Application
4.1 Measuring and dating financial crises
Identifying and observing the occurrence of financial crises is non-trivial and
the focus of much international research. The application here takes dates for
currency and banking crises for 21 countries over the period 1883 to 1998 from
Bordo et al (2001). This data takes the form of annual 1- 0 indices as compiled
by Bordo et al, taking a 1 in years when a crisis occurs. We use their longer
data set, covering 1883 to 1998, including Argentina, Australia, Belgium,
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the
UK and the US.
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A number of methods, including statistical criteria and event studies, have
been suggested to classify, measure and date financial crises see for example
the overview in Jacobs, Kuper and Lestano (2005). In the Bordo et al. paper
currency crises occur in association with either a forced change in parity, a
realignment or as indicated by an exchange market pressure index exceeding
a threshold value.6 Banking crises are dated as periods of continuous financial
distress leading to substantial erosion of banking capital, as per Caprio and
Klingebiel (1996). Table 2 shows the occurrences of the crises in the dataset.
We can identify a number of simultaneous crisis periods in the data. In
1907 a banking crisis occurred in 7 of the 21 countries in the sample—see
Bordo and Eichengreen (2000) and Goodhart and Delargy (1998). Both
banking and currency crises were widespread in 1931, associated with the
Great Depression, with 8 countries experiencing both banking and currency
crises (twin crises), a further 5 countries a banking crisis alone, and a further
6 countries a currency crisis alone. The next major period of disruption in
the sample is the currency crises associated with the breakdown of Bretton
Woods in 1971 when 12 countries observed currency crises (but not banking
crises). The third major set of currency crises in the dataset occurs in the
1992 ERM crisis, when the UK and Italy exited the system, and 7 of the
European countries report a crisis observation (Denmark, France, Italy, the
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK).
6The exchange market pressure index is constructed as a weighted sum of exchange
rates, interest rate differentials and changes in reserves as per Eichengreen, Rose and
Wyplosz (1995,1996), and hence has an underlying data generating process unlike the
banking data.
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Table 2: Distribution of financial crises: 1893-1998 numbers
Currency crises Banking crises Twin crises
Argentina 19 8 4
Australia 7 2 0
Belgium 5 5 0
Brazil 13 9 3
Canada 10 1 0
Chile 10 5 1
Denmark 8 6 2
Finland 7 5 3
France 9 6 0
Germany 5 3 1
Greece 7 1 1
Italy 8 8 1
Japan 7 4 0
Netherlands 6 3 1
Norway 4 5 1
Portugal 6 5 2
Spain 8 5 1
Sweden 5 5 2
Switzerland 4 2 0
UK 11 1 0
US 7 9 2
All countries 166 51 25
15
Table 2 shows the results of tests of independence against a first order
Markov process on the transition matrices as described in the previous section
for each of the 21 data series in both currency and banking crises. As is
quickly observed, almost all series display independence. The exceptions are
in Denmark for currency crises, and France, Norway and the US for banking
crises.
Table 3: Univariate tests of independence versus first order Markov process:
p-values
Currency crises Banking crises
Argentina 0.2647 0.3527
Australia 0.3057 0.9654
Belgium 0.7975 0.1881
Brazil 0.2694 0.1248
Canada 0.3870 0.9913
Chile 0.3870 0.7975
Denmark 0.0101 0.2491
Finland 0.6364 0.7975
France 0.3860 0.0297
Germany 0.7975 0.9231
Greece 0.3057 0.9913
Italy 0.3527 0.3527
Japan 0.3057 0.8663
Netherlands 0.7197 0.9231
Norway 0.8663 0.0141
Portugal 0.7197 0.1881
Spain 0.5511 0.1881
Sweden 0.1881 0.1881
Switzerland 0.8663 0.9654
UK 0.0597 0.9913
US 0.3057 0.0018
Note: bold indicates rejection of null hypothesis of no serial correlation
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4.2 Bivariate concordance outcomes
Table 4 shows bivariate turbulent period concordance indices for currency
crises, and corresponding 95% critical values derived from Fisher exact test,
again shown in the upper and lower triangles of the table respectively. Bi-
variate independence tests involving any of the serially correlated series are
based on corrected Pearson chi-squared statistics, while for combinations not
including a serially correlated series the Fisher exact test method is appropri-
ate. The effects of ignoring serial correlation are best illustrated for bivariate
concordance indices involving Denmark. On the basis of the Fisher exact
test critical values listed in the lower triangle in the table the null hypothesis
is independence between currency crisis in Denmark and the other countries
in the sample is rejected for many countries (Finland, Greece, Japan, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and the United King-
dom). However, independence is not rejected once we allow for serial corre-
lation (as seen in Table 4).
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The country pairs for which currency crises reject the null of indepen-
dence predominantly involve Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Norway or Swe-
den as one of the pair considered. Sweden particularly rejects independence
with the majority of its potential European partners in the Table. Belgium
and the Netherlands also reject independence with a substantial number of
other European nations. Argentina rejects independence with the other Latin
American countries in the sample (in addition to a number of others). These
results lend further credence to the concern over regional interdependence in
financial crises; for example Kaminsky and Reinhart (2002), Glick and Rose
(1999), and Dungey and Martin (2005).
Table 5 lists bivariate turbulent period concordance indices and corre-
sponding 95% critical values derived from Fisher exact test for banking crises.
In contrast with the currency crises, once serial correlation has been taken
into account for France, Norway and the US, very few of the country pairs
reject independence for banking crises. The exceptions are Belgium with
each of Finland and Spain, Poland with both Spain and Switzerland and
Switzerland with Finland. This set of five countries consistently rejects inde-
pendence between their banking crises, but not for all possible combinations
within the five (for example, Polish and Finnish crises are independent, while
Polish and Swiss and Finish and Swiss crises are not).
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Other combinations of bivariate tests are also easily constructed. For
example we can construct concordance indices for the possibility of a bank-
ing crisis in one country being associated with a currency crisis in another.
These are very low incidence crises, as recorded in Table 2 above. However,
Bordo et al. (2001) calculate that twin crises are twice as costly as currency
crises and four times more costly than banking crises in terms of output loss,
and Eichengreen and Bordo (2003) claim this type of crisis is more frequent
in recent history.7 This suggests that the concordance of twin crises is an
interesting avenue for future work.
Given the relationships revealed by the bivariate indices we now consider
the construction and testing of the multivariate concordance indices.
4.3 Multivariate concordance indices
Table 6 reports the multivariate concordance indices for the group of crises
which involves both types of crisis and all countries, that is the entire sample.
Each row reports the concordance index for the stated number of common
crises occurring across these categories shown in the first column. So the first
row reports the concordance index for at least two concurrent currency crises
across the 21 economies sampled. A total of 39 time periods are identified
which fulfill that criteria, giving a turbulent periods index of 0.58.
The final column of Table 6 reports the 95% critical value for the concor-
dance indices in each case expressed as the minimum number of times that
7Bordo et al. (2001) express some surprise at the relatively smaller size of the loss
of banking crises compared with currency crises, but find this result over a number of
sample periods. Their surprise stems from comparisons with alternative literature, such
as canvassed in Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) which rank the costs of banking
crises as above currency crises.
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one would observe that many crises and be able to reject the null of indepen-
dence. That is for the row of at least two simultaneous currency crises, one
can observe up to 19 occurrences of two simultaneous crises without having
to reject independence. In the sample there are 39 occurrences of at least
two simultaneous currency crises, clearly rejecting independence. The results
in Table 6 show that the sample rejects independence between simultaneous
crises in all instances. The table shows that a single occurrence of five si-
multaneous currency crises (four simultaneous banking crises) is sufficient
to reject independence in the data. This implies there is some underlying
mechanism connecting the observed occurrence of simultaneous crises.
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Table 6: Multivariate concordance indexes
Turbulent periods Observations Critical value
Across countries–currency crises type
At least 2 crises 0.58 39 19
At least 3 crises 0.30 20 8
At least 4 crises 0.15 10 3
At least 5 crises 0.10 7 1
At least 6 crises 0.09 6 1
At least 7 crises 0.06 4 1
At least 8 crises 0.04 3 1
At least 10 crises 0.03 2 1
At least 12 crises 0.03 2 1
At least 14 crises 0.01 1 1
Crises observations (T −#(0)) 99
Across countries–banking crises type
At least 2 crises 0.59 24 6
At least 3 crises 0.34 14 2
At least 4 crises 0.12 5 1
At least 5 crises 0.07 3 1
At least 6 crises 0.05 2 1
At least 7 crises 0.05 2 1
At least 8 crises 0.02 1 1
At least 10 crises 0.02 1 1
At least 12 crises 0.02 1 1
At least 14 crises 0.02 1 1
Total crises (T −#(0)) 57
Note: the critical value gives the minimum number of observations for the case at hand
that rejects the null hypothesis of multivariate independence at the 5 per cent level.
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Policy makers are correct to be concerned about the occurrence of a cri-
sis. However, knowing which crises are going to spread is as yet unresolved.
Isolating the characteristics of what makes a particular crisis spread, or al-
ternatively what makes other markets vulnerable to spread from other crises
remains an important issue, and is the focus of work on indicators of financial
fragility such as associated with Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000).
Unfortunately this literature has not been particularly successful to date,
with the relatively poor performance of these indicators documented in Berg
and Patillo (1999). The problem lies with the heterogeneity of the crises; it
seems no two crises are ever the same. However, it is important we do know
that crisis situations will tend to exacerbate other weaknesses in the economy
and financial system, increasing the possibility of crises in other markets and
countries, which is the aspect we see reflected in the concordance indices and
their critical values.
5 Historical analysis
To illustrate the usefulness of the concordance indices, we analyse their pat-
terns over time for the 20th Century. Figure 3 shows recursive calculations of
the concordance indices using the initial 20 observations as the starting point
and increasing the sample size by one observation at the time. Increases in
the concordance index indicate an increase in international financial turmoil,
and as shown before only a relatively small number of countries experienc-
ing simultaneous financial crisis is sufficient to reject independence between
them. A stable concordance index is associated with a period of tranquility.
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A decrease in the concordance index is equally informative, as it signals an
increase in isolated financial turmoil, that is turmoil confined to single or
small groups of countries. Figure 3 is the recursive concordance index for
the case of 2 or more simultaneous crises, so that a decline in this index is
associated with the occurrence of isolated single crises. Similar indices can
be constructed for greater values of simultaneous crisis, as discussed further
below.
Figure 3: Recursive multivariate concordance indices, 1903–1998
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currency banking
We observe a constant value of the currency concordance index from 1908
to 1920, indicating periods of financial tranquility. The 1920s is characterised
by periods of both international turmoil (increases in the index) and isolated
turmoil (decreases in the index). The extended period of the 1929 crash
and the following Depression results in an extended period of increase in
the currency concordance index up to 1938, indicating a period of sustained
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international turmoil. Immediately prior to World War II there is some
evidence of isolated turmoil, and then a fixed regime prevails until 1946
associated with War time regulation. From 1946 to 1963 is a period of
general decline in the currency concordance index, interpretable as a period
of isolated turmoil. This corresponds to the first period of what Bordo et al
(2001) characterise as the Bretton-Woods era from 1945 to 1971. Pressure
on the international financial system began to emerge from 1963 onwards,
evident in the increase in the currency concordance index. The collapse of
Bretton-Woods is followed by a brief period of stability up to 1974 whereafter
a number of countries suffer crises over the following years, and the index
continues to climb over the periods of the first and second oil crises through
to 1988. A small decrease in the index in 1989-1990 indicates some isolated
turmoil. The currency concordance index then increases to the penultimate
year in the sample, reflecting the general period of international financial
turmoil of the 1990s.
The banking concordance index displays a similar pattern to the cur-
rency index up to and including the period of World War II. The effect of
the Depression on the banking crisis concordance index is less pronounced
than for the currency index. A very long stable period in the banking crisis
concordance index prevails until 1963. Some isolated turmoil then reduces
the index in 1964 which remains stable until 1976. The index then decreases
up to 1986, and has its last prominent increase to 1991, associated with
increased international turmoil. Thereafter the index is relatively stable, al-
though not constant as in previous periods. Bordo et al (2001) find that the
banking crises are more likely in periods of lower capital controls, in par-
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ticular contrasting the Bretton Woods period with the current period. Our
results suggest that post Bretton Woods banking crises occurred more fre-
quently as independent events than they did previously - that is the banking
crisis concordance index declines in the latter part of the sample, implying
that the banking crises are more likely to be related to individual country
specific conditions.
An interesting aspect of Figure 3 is that although the number of banking
and currency crises are quite different, the values of the concordance indices
for banking and currency crises at the end of the sample period are quite
similar. However, the historical pattern differs across the two indices. In
general there have been more periods of international financial turmoil in
currency crises, leading to an increase in the index over the 20th century,
while banking crises have tended to be more internationally linked at the
beginning of the century than the end. Banking crises have tended to have
relatively more independent occurrences. The relative changes in the banking
and currency crisis concordance indices in the 1970s support Kaminsky and
Reinhart (1999) in finding little relationship between banking and currency
crises in this decade. Both this and the claim that banking and currency
crises are likely to be reinforcing could be more fully investigated with a twin
crisis multivariate index.
There are a number of interesting hypotheses in the literature where the
existing results can be augmented using these indices. First, although it may
remain true that currency crises are more prevalent with emerging market
data (Bordo et al, 2001), the currency crisis concordance index also reveals
that there has been increasing incidence of internationally linked currency
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crises in a set of countries dominated by developed nations. Second, coun-
tries without capital controls are more likely to experience banking crises
(Bordo et al, 2001, Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). However, the banking
crisis concordance indices show that the more recent liberalisations in bank-
ing systems in the 1980s onwards have been associated with instances of
isolated crisis, rather than the more international banking crises seen in the
early part of the 20th century. That is, the looser controls period is asso-
ciated with more banking crises, but they are also less likely to be part of
international banking turmoil. Third, in the 1980s banking and currency
crises may be linked and reinforcing (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). The
concordance indices for these two crisis types move in opposite directions
during the 1980s. If the two types of crisis are linked, then the impetus
comes from independently occurring banking crises, which may then spread
to international currency crises. Bordo et al (2001) claim that currency crisis
frequency has increased relative to earlier periods, additionally, our analysis
shows that currency crises are more internationally linked in the 1990s than
in most earlier periods, with the exception of the last part of the 1930s. His-
torically, the prevalence of both banking and currency crises post 1973 is akin
only to the turmoil in the 1920s and 1930s, Bordo et al (2001). However, our
analysis shows that the internationalisation of crises in the 1970s is below
that of the mid-1930s. In particular, for banking crises, the international
interdependence of banking crises is less at the end of the century than the
beginning. Our results support the finding of Bordo et al that the popular
perception of a crisis prone 1990s is due to the prevalence of currency crises,
and in our analysis particularly multiple contemporaneous currency crises.
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Eichengreen and Bordo (2003) and Bordo et al (2001) conclude that fi-
nancial crises have not evidently grown more severe over the 20th century
but are more prevalent, to which our analysis adds that currency crises have
become both more prevalent and more likely to be associated with interna-
tional turmoil, while banking crises have become more prevalent but more
likely to be independent and country specific events for this sample.8
The concordance indices can also be used to make conditional statements
about the implications of a crisis in terms of its management and the inter-
national policy debate. Karolyi (2003) for example, has argued that more
resources should be directed to domestic economic problems than to reforms
of the international system. If the occurrence of a financial crisis in a country
is associated with a fall in the concordance index, this supports the argument
that domestic policy solutions are required. If, however, the concordance
index rises this suggests that there is associated international turmoil, and
there may be a case for considering international reforms; as we have formally
tested, the probability of unconnected multiple contemporaneous financial
crises across international borders is very low.
6 Conclusion
This paper developed a turmoil-periods concordance index for financial crises,
with the property of being readily interpretable over time. The turmoil-
periods concordance index was designed for use with the typically binary, low
incidence, potentially serially correlated crisis events data and extended to
8Dungey, Jacobs and Lestano (2004) suggest that for the Asian crisis there is evidence
of significant international cross border banking crises.
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incorporate the concept of multivariate synchronisation between more than
two countries simultaneously. The properties of the index were explored,
including a simple means of constructing critical values for testing the in-
dependence of observed events. Moves in the multivariate turmoil-periods
concordance index were used to consider the changing pattern of financial
turmoil in world financial markets for the period 1883-1998. Stability in the
index value indicated periods of stability. A decline in the index indicated
the presence of independent crises, where an independent crisis occurred in
a single or small group of countries and coincidental timing could not be
dismissed. An increase in the index value indicated internationally linked
financial turmoil - the financial crises involved did not occur independently.
Concordance indices for banking and currency crises for 21 countries cur-
rency and banking crises from 1883-1998 were constructed using data from
Bordo et al (2001). Concurrent crises were unlikely to occur independently.
In the data sample an observation of 5 (4) or more currency (banking) crises
rejected independence between these events, that is they were not coinci-
dental. Several significant periods of international financial turmoil were
identified. In currency crises these were in the 1930s, from the mid-1960s
to mid-1970s and throughout most of the 1990s. In banking crises the peri-
ods of international financial turmoil were identified in the 1930s and early
1990s. Periods of isolated turmoil were identified in the Bretton-Woods era
for currencies and broadly from the mid-1960s to early 1990s for banking.
The degree of international financial turmoil in currency crises was shown
to have broadly risen over the 20th century, associated with a rise in the
currency crisis turbulent-periods concordance index. In contrast, the degree
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of international financial turmoil in banking crises fell over the 20th century,
shown as a fall in the banking crisis turbulent-periods concordance index.
None of these indices provide information about the underlying causes
of the crises, although they strongly suggest there are relationships behind
the simultaneous, or near-simultaneous, occurrence of crises. Clearly the
tests for whether crises are related will be affected by definition, timing and
measurement of when a crisis occurs.
Whether further analyses could be used to predict financial crises requires
some benchmark against which to measure potential algorithms, in a means
somewhat analogous to the methodology used in assessing business cycle dat-
ing as replicating the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the NBER dates
for the US business cycle. Researchers and policy makers would similarly
benefit from generally accepted chronologies of financial crises. An attempt
has been made in this direction by the dating of equity and housing price
cycles presented in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook in April 2003, IMF
(2003) and extension of this work to both other financial markets and a
broader range of economies, including developing markets, would be of im-
mense assistance. An important step forward would be the institution of a
Financial Crises Dating Committee.
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